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This study explores the ways in which federal and
state authorities have sought to deal with a difficult
problem of political power in the context of the U. S.
Constitution.

Oregon reapportionment history offers an

appropriate introduction to a critique of the national
reapportionment decisions of Baker vs Carr and Reynolds
vs Sims.

Its Constitution stipulated population and the

2

ratio derived from a population based formula were the
means by which apportionment was to be determined and noncompliance had been particularly evident from 1933 to 1952.
Also, by the initiative process and a decision by the Oregon
Supreme Court, Oregon had resolved its reapportionment problem before national action was taken, demonstrating that
a state could resolve such problems without national
intervention.
The critique of Baker vs Carr is an attempt to examine
the soundness of its judicial logic and thereby to demonstrate
the impact it has had in perpetrating certain concepts
of government.
The data consulted included interviews with people
directly involved in the events considered, Supreme Court
decisions, secondary studies, state documents containing
legislative minutes and exhibits.
Oregon reapportionment history shows the ability of
a state to solve a controversial political problem through
the initiative process.

However, the judicial logic in

Baker vs Carr has created a new majoritarian philosophy of
government that is unmindful of traditional concepts of
federalism, and the Oregon experience.
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C:iAFTE:it I

Philosophically and historically,

Ore~on

reapporti)n-

ment provides a prelude well-suited to the study of
natior.al

reapportion~ent

ys Sims.

cases,

Ba~er

t~e

vs Carr and Reynolds

From its inception the Oregon Constitution

contained provisions for reapportionment which, to a great
extent, embodied the Majoritarian philosophy of these
decisions.

In Section 6 of the Constitution, it stated:

The number of Senators and Representatives shall
at the session next following an enumeration
of the inhabitants by the United States, or this
State, be fixed by law, and apportioned among
the several cour.ties according to the number
of white population in each. And the ratio of
Senators and ~epresentatives shall be deterMined
by dividing the whole n~~ber of white population
of such county, or district by such respective
ratios; and when a fraction shall result from
such division, which shall exceed one half of
said ratio, such county, or district shall be
entitled to a member for such fraction; And in
case any county shall not have the requisite
population to entitle such county to a menber,
then such county shall be attached to some adjoining C£unty for Senatorial or Representative
purposes.
1

(Salem:

Charles H. Carey, ed., The Ore~on Consti:ution,
State Printing Department, 1926), p~. lC7-4Cd.

2

Population and the ratio resulting from this base were to
be the standards for apportioning state senators and state
representatives, yet during the first half of the twentieth
century Oregon had noticeably faltered in fulfilling its
constitutional mandate.

The consequence being that Oregon,

like many other states, witnessed a dramatic struggle for
legislative power between urban and rural areas as gross
population inequities abounded.

The seriousness of this

confrontation was a source of nationwide concern.

The

magnitude of the controversy became increasingly felt during
the late 1940's--a time when the nation, no longer in the
shac~les

of war, directed its attention to the urban

metropolis teeming with people and to the growing burdens
these numbers created for municipal government and its
finances.
solution to

So great were the problems for cities that the
the~

required political attention outside

the realm of municipalities.
reapport~onment

For the cities' the

movement, with its urban-oriented slogan

'one-man, one-vote,' began as a search for much-needed
solutions and soon became a vehement and meaningful expression of a quest for political identity.
most states, distinguished itself.

But Oregon,

unli~e

It aligned its

reapportionment history with the original intent of the
state constitution.

The Oregon voters decided this conflict

3
through the instrQ~er.tality of the initiative petition, 2
a notable accomplishment which predated 3aker vs Carr.
Oregon's initial apportionI'lent was February 14, 1859.
The state's senators and representatives totalled 16 and

34, respectively.

A year later the maximum was set at 30

and 60, but it wasn't until 1872 t~at these nu:r.lbers were
reached.

There were twenty-three reapportionments in

Oregon between 1859 and 1961:

eleven were general

reapportionments effecting one or both legislative houses
and twelve were minor ones made to allow legislative
adjustments for newly created counties.

Reapportionments

for both legislative branches numbered nine.

So perhaps

the truest figure for judging the legislature's fulfillment
of its constitutional mandate is this latter figure.

Initially

it appears to be a relatively healthy compliance with the
population principle of reapportionment for every ten years
in accordance with census figures; however, if just the
nine reapportionments stretched over a period of approximately
102 years are considered, the statistics are indeed deceptive.

The variable closest to shedding light on the truth

is the precise time the nine reapportionments were made.
Before 1900 five of them were achieved, two of which were
only

two years apart, 1862 and 1864.

After the turn

2 Gordon E. Baker, "Reapportionment by Initiative in
Oregon," Western Political ;uarterly 2 (June 1960): 508.

4
of the century, four

reacoorti·c~~ents
-...
v

were

co~plP~e~
••
~\.;'~·

But between the 1931-19J3readjustnents and the initiative
sanctioned demand for reapportionl"'Jer:t in Novenber, 1952,
there was a span of alnast twenty years.

focusi~g

Before

upon some of the struggle caused by the effects of legislative inaction, a cursory glance at various aspects of
Oregon's geograpI'.y, economy, and demographic patterns is
essential.
Many of Oregon's western counties had been forrned
by natural boundaries.

The most easterly counties of

western Oregon are bounded on the east by the prominent
barrier, the Cascade Mountains, whereas counties on the
extreme west are bounded by the Pacific Ocean.

There are

several remaining counties between these boundary counties
of western Oregon.

Together all these western counties

cover an area of approximately one-third of the state's

96,2093 square miles.

The counties are Clatsop, Columbia,

Tillamook, Washington, Mul tnoma...11, Clackamas, Yamhi 11,
Marion, Lincoln, Polk, Benton, Linn, Douglas, Coos, Curry,
Josephine, and Jackson.

The remaining

two-thir~s

of Cregan

roll from the Cascade Mountains easterly to the Idaho 3order.
This spacious eastern expanse has substantially less rainfall,
3coun tv and Ci tv :)a ta 3001-~, U. S. Departrlen~ of Cora."'":erce
3ureau of t~e Census, 1967.
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considerably higher percentage of land under irrieation,
and proportionately much larger sized counties than its
western counterpart.

No large or navigable river, such

as the Willamette in western Oregon, cut into this vast
area.

Only its northern or eastern-most counties could boast

of the Columbia or Snake River as their boundary.

Along

the Columbia River are Hood River, Wasco, Sherman, Gilliam,
and Morrow counties.

Those counties along the Snake River

are Wallowa, Baker, and Malheur counties.

Aside from these

two groups of eastern counties, there remain Jefferson,
Deschutes, Klamath, Lake, Crook, Wheeler, Grant, Harney,
Union, and Umatilla counties.
Economically, the western counties are more diversified
agriculturally and industrially than the eastern counties.
The multiplicity of transportation routes and of transportation modes in western Oregon are contributive to important
concentrations of industrialization.

But the vastness and

dryness of eastern Oregon is and was conducive to large
farms, a fact long known in Oregon and one confirmed by

1964 figures.

They indicate approximately 1/2 of eastern

Oregon contained farms of J,000 to 6,0004 acres, and a
substantial portion of the remaining half area were in
4A Preliminary Atlas of Ore~on, University of Oregon,
5-1, 5-2 (based on 1964 figures.)

Department of Geography, pp.

6
farms between 1,000 to 3,0005 acres.

On

the other hand

western Oregon's farm size averaged between 100 to
acres.

Soo 6

Of this land in eastern Oregon most was used for

hay, wheat, Irish potatoes, or cattle production along
with significant contributions of fruit production from
Hood River and Wasco counties.

Looking at a map showing

irrigation statistics by counties one can see between 60
to 100%7 of land under irrigation in eastern Oregon as contrasted by 0 to 8o%6under irrigation in western Oregon of
which 20 to 40%9was the greatest amount.
The history of Oregon's demographic patterns is
interwoven with its geographic features and economic
development.

Population growth is important, since not

only does it account for the creation of counties and the
establishment of senatorial and representative districts,
but it also introduces the problem of representation and
population consistency.
Before 1860 people flocked to the western region of
the state, settling priMarily along coastal areas and

5A Preliminary Atlas of Oregon, University of Oregon,
Department of Geography, pp. 5-1, 5-2 (based on 1964 figures).
6 rbid.
7Ibid. pp. 5-5,
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.

5-6

(based on 1964 figures).

7
rivers such as the Willamette and Tualatin.
nineteenth century

c~~e

to a close, western Oregon continued

in its population increase.
and

~nowledge

discoverie~

As the

As Indian troubles subsided

of eastern Oregon's timber resources, gold

grazing lands, and soil rich for grain crops

became known, there was a tremendous spur of population
growth in this region, too.

But by 1930 the figures

reflected steep population drops in this region, whereas
western Oregon continued to show population expansion.
In 1930 Multnomah County alone with its major city, Portland,
had approximately 35% of the state's total.

From this time

to the 1960 1 s, the state's pattern of growth by numbers
was in western Oregon predominately.
reasons for such a development.

There were many

Among them were the attrac-

tions of commerce and industry afforded by the metropolitan
areas a.long the Willamette River.

Coastal regions increas-

ingly drew retirees to what soon became a retirement oasis
and it also catered to vacationers by developing its recreation centers.

Needless to say, the automobile made

its indelible imprint on Oregon's population character.
Western Oregon's advantage of more and better roads plus the
opportunities awaiting people seeking work in centers of
industry and lu.·11ber camps brought an influx of immigrants
and migrants.

Some of the newcomers filtered into orchard

and farming regions of eastern Oregon; however, the majority
settled west of the Cascades.

The development of the sublll'bs

from 1945 onward did muc~ to contribute new demographic
features.

Tl-lese becroom cor:·T:ur:i ties ;;ere an extension

of the urban centers from 1,..;l':ich t::ey fanned.
distance was usually between 2 to

25

miles.

The
Often

they were in counties other than the county of the
principal city about which they were clustered.

This,

therefore, frequently contributed to a significant rise
in population of adjacent counties.

In addition to these

changes certain events created conditions that visibly
affected population patterns.

10

For example, during

the Great Depression millions of unemployed looked for
much-needed jobs in the cities. 11

The Dust Bowl in the

central plains States caused farmers and share croppers
to desert their wind-parched farms and seek new
opportunities, while the Agricultural Adjustment Act
encouraged thousands to leave the south. 12

Later, both

World War II and the Korean Conflict created millions of
new jobs in urban centers.

1

3

These and other influences

contributed to the imbalance between eastern and western
lOGerald D. Nash, The American West in the Twe::tieth
Century (New Jersey:
Prentice-~all, Inc., 1973), in passi~.

11 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Crises of Eie Old
Order, 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957),
pp. 24t3-2:)1.
12 Arthur Schlesin~er, Jr., The Coming of the ~ew
Deal (3oston: 2ou~hton Eifflin Company, 1959), P• 379.
13~'
i~asr:,

in passim.

':'r.-:: A::-ierican Wes::, in the

Ti.;entie~:-.

Ce~:~~:r·:,

9
Oregon and for

t~e

snift of population from rural to urban

centers.
Population changes in the 1930 census did little
to alter severe

malapportiolli~ent.

The legislature gave a

slight nod of recognition to reapportionment in 1931 fer
the house and in 1933 for the senate, but the changes were
merely fractional in most instances, and in the

reappor-

tiorunent of the house only two counties, Deschutes and
Klamath, had substantial gains.
was lacking.
imately

35%

Thorough reapportionment

Eultnomah County, which contained approxof the state's population received no

additional representation.
Many reasons could be given to explain the legislature's failure to act.
the state's, and the

One was certainly the city's,

nation~

of the Great Depression.

preoccupation with the ills

Cities like New York, Chicago,

and Portland were weighted down by the oppressions of the
.
t 1rie s.

14

This preoccupation was soon followed by the

concerns of World War II.

Little effort was made to pursue

serious and lasting remedies for the ever-increasing problems cities were experiencing as a result of their sharply
rising populations.

This was certainly true of Portland,

for although sone people

no~ed

Ore0on 1 s failure to live up

to its constitutional mandate, it was to be the late
1 4schlesinger, The Crises of the Old Order, in oassim.
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forties, the fifties, and the sixties that Oreson, along
with the nation, was to feel the intense heat of the
reapportionment controversy.
In 1949 two bills purporting to ease or resolve the
state's legislative malapportionrnent were introduced into
the legislature.

Statements drawn from one side or another

and debates between opposing sides on the issue appeared
continually in newspapers and journals.

The tenor of these

debates was very similar to the one between Senator Richard
Neuberger of Multnomah County and Senator Philip Hitchcock
of Klamath County, published in the :Kagazine Section of
the Sunday Oregonian of October 30, 1949.

Many of the

thoughts expressed by each man are illustrative of the
attitudes and philosophies that were to dominate Oregon
and the nation throughout the next few decades.
Senator Neuberger represented the populous urban
interests and saw the solution to Oregon's problem in the
adherence to the deMocratic majoritarian philosophy of
government which demanded population as the criterion for
deterr.iining representation, a philosophy adaptable to the
reapportionment provision of the Oregon Constitution.
The Senator was willing to concede that no county should
have more than JO% of the state's representation.

T~ere

were

reasons underlying his compromise; especially the importance
gaining support from other counties was essential for
sone equitable re pre sen ta tio:-i for Eul tnomah County.

o~

securin~

Li,rn:-::. se,

11
strong fears prevailed tnat a true observance of the
constitutional mandate as interpreted by the urban group
would create an imbalance in the legislature with Multnomah
County's large numbers dominating it.

To allay these

fears, gross inequities in other counties, such as Klamath
and Lane Counties, were quickly pointed out.

But Senator

Hitchcock drew other inferences from the situation.

It

was not a question of majoritarian rule; rather it was
the reliance upon the philosophy of republican government
with the system of checks and balances designed to protect
minority interests and rights.

Believing the nation's

government to have been based on majoritarian rule was
"inaccurate." 1 5 The Senator further envisioned the
fulfillment of the constitutional mandate with Senator
Neuberger's interpretation as a step toward triumvirate
rule in the legislature by "three industrial counties of
the state of Oregon." 16 Representing the less populous,
agrarian-oriented counties, Senator Hitchcock also noted that
it was true during the adoption of the Oregon Constitution
that substantial population inequities existed. Still the
state as a whole had most of the same interests.

Oregon

had been primarily an agriculturally based economy.

Now the

fears grew out of the obvious differences of interests in

l5 Should the Oregon Legislature be Reapportioned?"
11

Oregonian, October 30, 19l9, Magazine Section, p. 9.
16
Ibid.

12

the state due to industrialization, or as the Senator
in comparing 1859 and 1949:

su~gested

"There was no segregation of

the population into classes with widely diverse interests
as there is today. 1117 Would the interests of a metropolitan
or suburban community be injurious to the interests of the
less populous rural community?

If so, how would its voice

be heard above the overwhelming cries of the urban complex? 18
To Senator Neuberger and his followers the problem
was clearly a question of rotten boroughs, or grossly underrepresented majorities.

To Senator Hitchcock and his

followers the problem was protecting minority rights and
interests in the event of a possible avalanche of majority
control by those of completely diverse backgrounds and interests.

The activities, attitudes, and philosophies of

each individual or group were greatly determined by its
sympathy for one side or the other.

In the most extreme

forms each side believed in strict conformity to its
criterion in the determination of representation, for
the urbanites it was population and for the ruralists it
was area or interests tied to territory.
l7"Should the Oregon Legislature be reapportioned?"
Oregonian, October 30, 1949, Magazine Section, p. 9.
l~

c;"Reapportionrnent, 11 The Oregon Voter, 35 (October 8,

1949); 3-8.
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Those who hailed the population standard had several
advantages giving support to their cause.

Gross inequities

were a fact and were the result of population change.

The

Oregon Constitution had stipulated population and the
resultant ratio to be the basis for representation.

A sad

discrepancy between Oregon constitutional law and its
enforcement prevailed.

Also, the use of population as a

criterion was advantageous because it was statistically
measurable and, therefore, a relatively reliable index.
Moreover, the large metropolitan areas of the nation were
thrusting upon the country a forceful political identity
and an awakening of power to be reckoned with.

The force

against which the battle was to be waged was equally
formidable.

Those who hailed the area standard had the

advantage of a malapportioned legislature capable of
stiffling legislative reapportionment action.

Rural interests

had a century of dominance in the l.egislature and the
identity of rural America was embedded in the history of
the state and the nation.

Also, area was an unchangeable,

measurable standard, and in Oregon 2/3's of the area was
east of the Cascades in the large agricultural regions.
This boast could counteract the population standard which
threatened to deprive this eastern region of much of its
representation and, consequently, its power in the legislature.
Moreover, the insistence upon the philosophy of republican

14

government with checKs and balances designed to protect
minority rights was neither vacant nor obsolete.
problem remained.
interpreted?

As

How was representation to be
t~e

reapportionnent controversy loomed

high on the horizon of Oregon politics,
found.

The

However, during the

follo~ing

a

solution was

decades reiterations

and accentuations of these two poles of conviction arose
interspersed with numerous modifications.
In view of the sharp rise of public sentiment and
the onrush of political debate, it was no surprise to
see a reapportionment measure on the November
ballot.

7,

1950

Enough signatures had been procured for the

initiative petition.

Some of its most notable items proposed

as an amendment to the constitution were increasing the
number of senators to thirty-six, allowing at least one
representative for each county, requiring a ceiling of
one-fourth the legislature's seats to any one county,
and enlarging reapportionment enforcement to the Secretary
of State should the legislature fail in its duty or giving
the Supreme Court jurisdiction should both fail.

It was

a compromise designed to provide some protection for
ruralists and to offer some equity for urbanites.

But

those who would have the most to lose made the greatest
protest.

They were labor and other metropolitan interest

15
groups who opposed the proposal and urged voters to
"preserve our right to equal representation. 1119
election returns showed
no votes.

190,992

20

The

yes votes and 215,302 21

The initiative of 1950 was defeated by approx-

imately 24,310 votes.

Perhaps the most significant role

played by the 1950 measure was its inestimable value as
a testing ground for 1952.

What was lac~dng in 1950 was

very much apparent in 1952.

Political reality had made

itself felt amongst politically oriented groups and
individuals.

Doubtless, the reasonable recourse was to

reassess views.

The jockeying for new leadership within

the Young Republicans was an example.

Leading the College League

of the Young Republicans in strongly dissenting from the

views held by the major forces of the Young Republicans,
Clay

Myer~

repeated efforts for acceptance and ascendancy

were rewarded by his capturing the chairmanship of the
Young Republicans and, with the assistance of his group,
redirecting the Young Republicans' attitudes on reapportionment.22

1950

Likewise, influence was felt in the Young

19 state of Oregon, Oregon Voter's Pamphlet, November 7,
(Salem, Secretary of State's Office, 19SO), p. 34.

20 state of Oregon, Oregon Bluebook, 1963-1964 (Salem,
Secretary of State's Office, 1963), p. 203.
21

Ibid.

22 rnterview with Clay Y.yers, Oregon Secretary of State,
Salem, Oregon, January 2, 1976.
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Democrats with Walter Dodd, a University of Oregon
professor of political science and a knowledgable researcher
on Oregon reapportionment, persuasively making his expertise
and credo known.

The Non-Partisan Committee for Constitutional

Reapportionment came into being as a result of the concerted efforts of the League of Women Voters, the Young
Republicans and the Young Democrats.

To gain the League

of Women Voters' support, the Young Republicans approached
the Young Democrats to form the Non-Partisan Committee for
Constitutional Reapportionment with bi-partisan representation. 23

Effective backing was also contributed by organized

labor and other urban allied groups. Added to this political
strength was newspaper support 24 from the Oregonian, the
Oregon Journal, and the Oregon Statesman as well as "two
of eastern Oregon's most important dailies, the Bend
Bulletin and the Pendleton East Oregonian." 2 5
On November 2, 1952,an initiative petition amending
the constitution and affirming its basic content of an
apportionment based on population and the population ratio
was presented to the electorate.

Features of the initiative

petition that might be considered attractive to the people
2

3rnterview with Clay Myers, Oregon Secretary of
State, Salem, Oregon, .May 24, 1976.
2 4Baker, "Reapportionment by Initiative in Oregon,"

p. 512.
2 5Ibid.

17
were that it contained the spirit of the original constitutional provision providing population and its ratio
formula as the basis of representation; it incorporated
the 1950 section which enlarged reapportionment jurisdiction
by guaranteeing proper enforcement through the ultimate
review of the Supreme Court if necessary; it left the
maximum senate seats at thirty avoiding further tax burdens
that the 1950 specifications of an additional six members
might have caused.

But probably the most significant

factor assisting the measure was the belief that adherence
to the Oregon Constitution meant compromise for both area
and population philosophies of government. 26 This was the
reason for the League's sudden change from its adamant
stand against literal interpretation of the constitution.
It was also a belief held by the Young Republicans, and Clay
Myers, and it was publically applauded by the press. 2 7
The 'major fraction' section of the constitution was the
key.

According to the rules of 'major fraction,' "once a

county or district has obtained more than half a ratio it
is ipso facto entitled to a member before another county
or district having more than 1 1/2 ratios is entitled to
28
additional representation.
260 regon1an,
.
April 28, 1952.

27 Ibid.
28 League of Women Voters, "Reapportionment,"

(Portland, OR.:

November, 1951), p.

5.

16
With the asswnption that the total population for
Oregon was about l,50C,OOO, the League of Women Voters
believed:
If it takes approximately 50,000 people (the
ratio) to elect a senator, any county that
has 25,00l people is entitled to one senator
because it has at least one person over
one-half the number required by the "ratio"
needed for one senator. Each district with a
major fraction of a "ratio" (25,00l), or a full
ratio (50,000) is assigned a senator. Then
those districts with one full ratio plus a major
fraction (75,00l) or two full ratios (100,000)
receive a second senator. This is continued
until the thirty senators are assigned.
It is
apparent from this procedure th~t the heavily
populated counties (Multnomah) may be left with
a major fraction of or a full ration or more for
which they receive no legislator. The following
examples are for senatorial representation:
Benton Co. with pop. of 31,500 which is major
fraction of 50,000 receives one senator.
Clackamas Co. with pop. of 86,600 (50,000 plus
36,000) gets two senators.
Lane Co. with pop. of 125,000 has 2 full ratios
but less than the major fraction needed for third
senator so gets two senators.
Mult. Co. with pop. of 468,ooo has 9 full ratios
but there are not enough senators to fill it out
so they get 7 senators.
Under this system, established in our state
constitution, the smaller counties are given full
representation first.
The lM'ger counties receive
what is left. This is not area and interest, nor
straight population representation, but it
represents a compromise between the two theories. 2 9
Xany seemed to have thought this was t:1e intent of the 1952
initiative petition.

In fact, Shirley A. Field who was then

a practicing attorney and one of the drafters

of the

amendment unequivocally stated the 'major fraction' rule as
2 9League of WoMen Voters, "Reapportionment," (Portland,
Or.: November, 1951), p. 5.

19
conceived by Clay :·:ye rs was the intent of its fran1ers.
Such interpretations certainly softened the prospect of
any adherence to the 'pure' population principle and
were contributive to wielding impressive voter power.
All these desirable factors were instrumental in
securing passage of the measure.

It was adopted by an

overwhelming majority of approximately 163,258 votes

(194,292

30

.

no votes and 357,550

31

yes votes).

If the

passage of the 1952 constitutional amendment was looked
upon by observers as a political truce or the end of the
reapportionment controversy, they were very mistaken.
While many legislators were concentrating on refinements
of reapportionment in matters such as subdistricting
or election by position number, others were either
still attempting to persuade the legislature, the courts,
and the electorate to adopt either a federal plan insuring
each county a senator or representative or pushing for
some newly conceived 'balanced plan' more favorable to
ruralists than the 1952 measure.
In 1953 Representative David Baum of La Grande, whose
constituency would be effected by observance of

t~e

constitutional mandate, filed suit against the 1952

30 Oregon 3luebook, 19 6 3-1964, p. 203.
3libid.

new

20

amendment

"as~:ing

:'or a declaratory judgment that the
amendMent was invalid."3 2 His principal argument was that
the extension of jurisdiction to the Oreeon Supreme Court
was a violation of the separation of powers.

Baum took

the position that reapportionment was solely a legislative
function.

The circuit court decided for the amendment and

upon appeal the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
judgment.
Understandably eastern Oregon felt the loss of power
in the legislature.

The predominance of urban interests

to the detriment of rural interests continued to be their
main concern.

Past arguments both forceful and

wea~

continued to be reiterated in the ruralist's defense.
Basic to some of them was the strong belief in the 'solid
virtues' of the farmer.

Because of "his honest industry,

his independence, his frank s"'.:lirit of equality, 11 33
and "his ability to produce and enjoy a simple abundance,"34
the farmer was admired and extolled as the ideal man.
During the 18th century the subject or hero was the yeoman
farmer.

But commercialization, industrialization, and

urbanization progressively destroyed the facts upon which
32Legislative Committee on Reapportionment, Le~islati ve
Rea;portiorunent Do-it-Yourself Kit (Salem: State Printing,

/19 ];/), p. 10.
33Richard Hofstader, The Age of Reform, (New York:
Vintage Books, 1955), p. 23.
31.hb·d
l
l
•
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this belief was built and as this diminished it gave way
to greater fancy and fiction.

Without discrimination this

pervasive belief, which historian Richard Hofstader had
so aptly terned "the agrarian myth, 11 35 was increasingly
used to include most all aspects of rural life and those
who participated in it.

In 1926 the tone of the argument

in Oregon was simple and direct.

It stated:

On the average, the outside counties elect
members whose mental and moral stature is
superior--on the average, we repeat--to
those elected by the Portland vote. Often
the large city needs protection against the
purposes and golicies of its own elected
legislators. 3
By 1954 a more sophisticated approach was accepted, yet
the undercurrent of the agrarian myth was nonetheless
present.

In the Oregon Voter Ralph T. Moore wrote:

There is no intent herein to indict urban
voters as such. They are fully as intelligent
and competent as rural voters. But they are
insulated from issues and candidates to a far
greater degree by circumstances that cannot be
voided. It follows that they miss the mark
in appraisal more often than do rural voters
and through no fault of their own.Jr
The Vale Enterorise agreed:
35Richard Hofstader, The Age of Reform, (New York:
3ooks, 1955), p. 23.

Vinta~e

3 611 1 egis
. 1 a t.ive A ppor t.ionmenv, II 0 regon Voter 46
(September 25, 1926), 4.
-1-

37Ibid.

Earch 20, 1954, p. 18.
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Ask any representative at Salem who it is that
has the greatest freedo~ of personal judgment, the
representatives of rural areas or those from
highly populated areas? He will tell you without
much hesitation that the political pressure from
pressure groups exerted for Multnomah County
lawmakers, for instance, would quickly lead to
much capricious, irresponsible legislation were it
not for the stabil~ty given the assembly by its
rural contingent.3b
Dissatisfaction with Oregon's amended reapportionment
provision reached new heights after the September, 1961,
Oregon Supreme Court decision of In re Legislative
Apportionment.

In the 1961 legislative session, the house

and senate passed House Bill 1665 which was a reiteration
of the intent Clay Myers, Shirley Field, the League of Women
Voters and others had had in drafting and sponsoring the

1952 constitutional amendment.

H. B. 1665 supported the

assumption that all counties registering a major fraction
ratio were entitled to their representation before counties
with ratios allowing them two or more legislators were
given their additional representation.
Chapter 482 of the Oregon Laws, 1961.

H. B. 1665 became
The problem was

that only 30 senate seats and 60 house seats could be alloted
among the thirty-six Oregon counties.

If major fractions

were thus treated, then counties with substantial ratios
like Lane, Jackson, or Multnomah Counties would be given
whatever was remaining.

In the 1961 apportionment,

3 811 Legislative Apportionment,"
(July 30, 1955, p. 4).

Oregon Voter

46
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Multnomah County was deprived of two whole ratios, one
for the house and one for the senate.

Lane and Jackson

Counties had no representation for the:r major fraction
ratios.
Attempting to redress this

inequit~

newly e lee ted Multnomah County legislator,

Vern Cook, a
too~~

action.

As attorney for petitioners--Charles McKinley; Howard Dean,
a political science professor at Portland State College;
and Donald Balmer, a political science professor at Lewis
and Clark College--he sought judicial remedy.

He petitioned

for review and in his brief was joined by Dirk Snel and
Reuben

Lens~e.

The latter also presented a brief amicus curiae

pro se, that is a brief presented by a person having no
right to appear in court but who is allowed in a suit to
introduce argument, evidence, or authority to protect his
interests.

Another petitioner was Eleanor

by William McLennan.

Kafour~

represented

Edward Fadeley, state representative

from Eugene, submitted his own brief.

The Attorney

General, Robert Thornton, and his assistant, Louis Bonney,
likewise offered opposition to the legislation in their
brief of amicus curiae.
constitutional and as

Those who regarded Chapter 482 as

equi~able

as possible were Portlanders

Clay Myers, Robert Jones, Ken Kaher, and Victor Atiyeh.
From Hood River and Eugene were George Annala and F. F.
Montgomery, respectively.

T:1ese men had attorneys Edwin

Peterson of Portland and Douglas Spencer of Eugene

~~~uing
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their cause in a brief amicus curiae.
delivered the court's opinion.
Multnomah County's

~ajor

Justice J. O'Connell

He temporarily disregarded

fraction and took issue with

the legislature's failure to apportion an additional
representative to the 12th senatorial district.
The plan had given
ratio of

8.868.

7 senators to a county having a

O'Connell objected saying:

••• it is impossible for us to conceive of
a reasonable interpretation of Article IV,
6 which would permit the legislative assembly
to subtract a whole number from the quotient
resulting from the application of the
constitutional formula for determin~ijg
representation in the state senate.
The ratio was arrived at by simple division of the state's
total population by 30 senate seats or 60 house seats,
depending upon which branch was being considered.

At

this time Multnomah County's population was high enough to
register a senatorial district ratio of

8.868 meaning

8 was the whole number ratio entitling the county to 8
senators and

.868 was the remaining major fraction.

the house seats Multnomah County had 17.736, 17 being

For
t~e

whole number ratio for which the County could expect
representative seats and

.736 was the major fraction.

The

apportionment plan being contested had favored some counties
with major fractions and neglected to allot the legislative
seats to two of Multnomah County's whole number ratios.
The Justice emphatically stated "representation is based

39rn re Le~islative Apportionment, 228 Oregon 570.
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on population ratio"40 and t!le "constitution makes no
mention of the use of any other factor in making apportionment. 41

Upon this premise the legislature has no authority

to modify apportionment so as to ignore the results of this
arithmetic process; whole number ratios cannot be disregarded.
Once apportionment for whole numbers was achieved then
latitude was

dee~ed

permissable with the legislature's

"power to adjust the major
seats.

f~actions 11 4 2

for the remaining

Words of caution were given by Justice O'Connell

when he admitted the legislature's power to combine
districts or to determine which major fraction county should
be given representation.

These actions were to be considered

adjustments to "the constitutional formula so that it can
be made to work."43

In other words all adjustments were

to be subordinate to and in conjunction with this ruling.
This was the first incident of Supreme Court action
based on enlarged jurisdictional powers granted it by the
1952 amendment which guaranteed enforcement of the constitutional provision.

The novelty of the action incensed many

rural legislators and rural-oriented groups and individuals.
4°rn re

Le~islative

4libid.

4 2 ~.,
43

~.,

p. 571.
p. 573.

Apportionment, 228 Oregon

570.
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In response to the decision they were successful in
drafting and placing on the November, 1961 ballot a
reapportionment initiative.

Of the sixty-five representa-

tive seats asked for, thirty were to be permanent with the
remaining thirty-five to be apportioned among counties on
the basis of population.
to thirty-five.

Senate seats were to be increased

The measure faile~ with 325,182 no44

votes and 197,322 yes45 votes being cast.
an overwhelming 127,860 votes.

The margin was

This was Oregon's final

answer as to its position on state legislative reapportionment and within the same month Oregon's stance was to
be reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court.

44oregon Bluebook, 1963-1964, p. 202.
45Ibid.

CHAPTER II
BAKER VS CARR
During the Warren Court's tenure, many decisions
of import were rendered under the aegis of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection.Clause.

Among them were

such decisions as the civil rights of black people and
the quality of the criminal justice system.

Whatever

a person's social, economic, or political views, it is
clear that the court's achievements in the realm of civil
liberties cannot be dismissed.

But paradoxically enough,

by its interpretation and application of the Equal Protection Clause as a basis for the protection of individual
voting rights, the court bestowed upon the nation its
assent to a democratic majoritarian philosophy.

Subject

to the most enthusiastic accolades and to the severest
criticism, Baker vs Carr (1962) was the Warren Court's
first and most crucial attempt to deal with malapportionment
which had become a much publicized problen in the nation
from the late forties through the fifties and sixties.
This great landmark decision of the Supreme Court began
the series of reapportionment cases reflecting a majoritarian philosophy, paved the way for the attractive
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nationally coined-phrase 'one man-one vote', and gave
credence to the belief that each person was entitled to
the

s~~e

weight his vote would carry as compared to his

counterpart's in other constituencies.

Besides the

Supreme Court's initial acceptance of the malapportionment
problem, the decision found the court, in effect, designating
itself as the responsible body to whom the resolution of
the problem should be addressed.

This posture coupled

with the majoritarian philosophy which most of the Warren
Court seemed to have espoused was the kindling that lit
the fire of controversy among court commentators.

Much

of the content in the justices' opinions in Baker was
devoted either to the defense of or the rebuttal of these
two points.

So paramount was the concern over the judiciary's

role that little was said or observed about the precise
way the court embraced the responsibility.

This serious

neglect warrants a re-examination of Baker vs Carr.
Baker vs Carr originated in a suit brought by Charles
Baker against Termesse 1 s Secretary of State Joe Carr.
These men were natives of Termesse who had moved from the
country to the city and played active roles in state
politics.

Charles Baker had become the Mayor of Millington

and a Millington representative on the Shelby County
Quarterly Court in 1950.

Millington was a town almost

grown into a suburb as a result of the tremendous growth
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created by its naval base during World War II.

Such

growth had drawn Millington and Memphis together maidng
whatever distance there was in miles seem insignificant.
The Shelby County Quarterly Court to which Millington
sent a representative was "a fiscal, legislative body
that ran the affairs of a rapidly urbanizing metropolitan
area where more than 600,000 people then lived."4 6 By

1954

Baker had been elected chairman of the committee.

Memphis and Charles Baker were to feel the impact of increasingly complex and pressing urban problems which required
appreciably greater finances.
the state's revenue

However, the inequity of

distribut~on,

because of a severly

malapportioned legislature, had left metropolitan governments like Memphis' in straits.

Having been prompted by

the desire to alleviate this situation, Charles Baker filed
suit against the 1901 Tennesse reapportionment statute
or more specifically against Joe Carr, the Secretary of
State.

Like so many of its sister states, Tennesse had

experienced a great shift in population from rural areas
to large metropolitan centers like Nashville, Memphis,
Knoxville, and Chattanooga.
fol1:wed this shift.

Yet, political power had not

It had been retained by the more

sparsely populated, agricultural regions of the state

4 6 Gene Graham, One Xan One Vote (Boston:
Brown, and Corr.pany 1972), p. 17.

Little,
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leaving urban areas grossly underrepresented in the state
General Assembly.

Charles Baker's

co~plaint

alleged that

the 1901 statute denied him and other persons residing in
similar type locale the Fourteenth Amendment's equal pro-·
tection of the laws "by virtue of the debasement of their
votes."47

The suit was dismissed by the federal district

court on the grounds that "it

lac~ed

jurisdiction of subject

matter and no claim was stated upon which relief could be
granted."4 8

The case was then appealed to the United

States Supreme Court.

Baker vs Carr was heard by the

Supreme Court and was decided March 26, 1962.

Writing

the majority opinion for the court was Justice William
Brennan whose order of issues for condideration fell into
three categories:

jurisdiction, standing, and justiciability.

A format clearly designed to answer the federal district
court's dismissal order in the manner in which the lower
court had answered the complaint.
To arrive at a greater perception and perspective of
Baker, it is best to follow the sequential patterns laid
down by the court and to include other Supreme Court
decisions.

Among them are Brown vs The Board of Education

and Reynolds vs Sims, handed down by the ilarren Court in
1954 and 1964 respectively.

Also there are Mahan vs

47Baker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 694.

48 Ibid.

Pric~ard,
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a product of the Burger Court in February of 1973, and
Luther vs Borden, the result of the Taney

Court's

deliberations in 1849.
The three categories in 3aker are distinguishable
by definitions commonly found in standard or legal dictionaries.

The court's power or authority to review a case,

which in effect means to interpret and apply the law, is
jurisdiction.

The position from which legal rights and

duties may be asserted or enforced is standing.

Finally,

the determination of whether it is proper or appropriate
for the court to hear a case is justiciability.

CHAPTER III
JURISDICTION
In addressing itself to the problem of jurisdiction,
the court in the majority opinion of Balrnr declared:
It is clear that the cause of action is
one which ''arises under" the Federal
Constitution. The complaint alleges that
the 1901 statute effects an apportionment
that deprives the appellants of the equal
protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment ••• 49
We hold that the District Court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
federal constitutional claim asserted in
the complaint • .50
With the admission of federal jurisdiction as sought by
the appellants in Baker under the Equal Protection Clause,
the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a political
right to which all individual voters were entitled.

The

court assented to the proposition that the political
right to be protected was equal voting weight; a doctrine
more clearly enunciated in later decisions.
Implicit in the court's acceptance of jurisdiction
over state legislative reapportionment as written by Justice
Brennan in the majority opinion is the admission of the
u9Baker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 700.
50ibid., p. 703.
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premise that just as every man is equal before the law
in

t~e

judicial system, so too every man is equal before

his government.

The equal relationship enjoyed by the

litigant and the voter to their several bodies necessarily
infers a 'one to one' relationship.

Such a basis furnishes

the logic for granting to every voter the individual
political right to an equal weight of his vote in the
electoral process.
The suggestion of a parallel to be drawn between
Baker vs Carr and previous Warren Court decisions under the
Equal Protection Clause further punctuates Justice Brennan's
theorem.

Brown vs The Board of Education and Baker vs Carr

have drawn frequent comments in this regard, probably
because both cases were and are landmark decisions deeply
effecting social history and political history.

To both

cases the court applied the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment extending individual rights.

Also,

Baker was the assertion of a political right under a civil
rights amendment whereas its predecessor, Brown, was the
declaration of a civil right under an amendment of the same
purport.

It is these qualities that lend themselves to

the consideration of the SupreMe Court's parallel usage of
this very familiar legal standard, one which even Justice
Fran.Kfurter alluded to in his dissent:
Appellants appear as representatives of a class
that is prejudiced as a class, in contradistinction
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to the polity in its entirety. However, the
discrimination relied on is the deprivation of
what appellants conceive to be their proportionate share of political influence. This,
of course, is the practical effect of any
allocation of power with the institutions
of government • .'::>l
Frankfurter's remarks were two fold.

They served as an

admonishment and a disclosure of what the Justice felt was
the court's subsequent abuse of its application of the
Equal Protection Clause.

The coincidence, thereby, offered

an open door for the Supreme Court's advancement of a
majoritarian philosophy of government.

But the question

now presents itself; was there substantial cause for Justice
Frankfurter's objection?

The key lies somewhere between

the parallel usage of the Clause and the premises upon
which it was applied.
In Brown vs the Board of Education the court
broadened the base of the Equal Protection Clause by
establishing the civil right of equal educational opportunity
(the subject to be protected was the Negro, more generally
racial minorities, and the object to be achieved was equal
educational opportunity through school desegregation).

In

Baker vs Carr the political right of the individual voter
to 'equal' voting weight at the polls was acxnowledged by
the court under the Equal Protection Clause (the subject
here to be protected was the individual voter and the

5lBaker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. p.

754.
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object to be achieved was "fair and effective"5 2
representation through equalized voting weight).
glance indicates obvious similarities.

A brief

Both were exten-

sions of constitutional rights under the same clause.

But

the essence of the parallel does not cc.me from the
expansion of the equal protection principle or rule;
rather it comes from the subject to which the principle is
applied and the object it endeavors to accomplish.
Racial status has its beginning and end in
and uncontrollable factor of birth.

the single

That it reaches group

dimensions is attributable only to others' possession of
it, and the degree of solidarity within the group varies
and is dependant on the pressures directed for or against
this sole factor.

Therefore, the people of the group

represent a "class"53of individuals.

In a statement made

by the American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon in testimony

before the Oregon House Elections Committee, April 1965 the
court's reasoning was aptly stated:
The American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon
endorses the principle that all men are equal
before the law and are, therefore, entitled to
equal votes and to equal representation in state
legislative assemblies. This principle of equality
of representation is embodied in the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

52 Reynolds

VS

Sims 84 s.ct. 1383.

53BaE.er vs Carr 82 S.Ct. 754.
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to the United States Constitution.54
The result of the court's premise relying on its analogous
reasoning and application in Brown and Baker has been to
create what the ACLU's remarks suggest; equality before the
law and equality of voting weight in participating within
the republican structure of

govern.~ent

are synonymous in

nature.
To achieve equality people must be conceived as numbers in a population figure; regard for historic, geographic,
economic, political, religious, and other special interests
is necessarily illogical.

Considerations such as these

create inequalities because they are highly variable factors,
a reality well demonstrated in politics.

Ironically,

those who praise the Warren Court for Baker vs Carr and
Reynolds vs Sims are sometimes the same individuals
lamenting the Supreme Court's failure to solve the gerrymander
problem.

A foremost example is Gordon Baker, an out-spoken

critic of state reapportionment during pre-Baker times.
In an essay devoted to the gerrymander, Mr. Baker commended
the court for past reapportionment actions and proceeded
to mention:
The most troublesorre question, however, not
only remained unsettled, but loomed even larger
in significance. The gerrymander--the intentional
manipulation of districts for partisan or
factual advantage--comprised in its various

Or.:

54House Elections Committee, SJl, Exhibit 6 (Salem,
April 14, 1965).
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forms, the heart of the ~olitical thicket tGat
the judiciary skirted most gingerly. Moreover,
the Supreme Court had paradoxically encouraged
the potential ~or widespread gerrymandering,
while gradually developing a single-minded
quest for mathematical equality. In
particular two decisions in the spring of
1969 laid t:1e groundwor£ (no doubt, unintentionally) for proliferating the more advanced
and subtle forms of discriminatory cartography.
Inevitable legal challenges will pose a
dilemma for the courts: whether to allow the
ideal of representative equality to be undermined by pervasive gerrymanders, or whether
to elaborate the stand~~d beyond mere
mathematical equality.??
Mr. Baker has accepted the 'one-man, one-vote' principle
as applied in Baker, but he has failed to grasp its full
significance.

The Supreme Court unconsciously encouraged

widespread gerrymandering; however, the groundwork was
laid in 1962 with Baker vs Carr.

In so doing the court

developed a new majoritarian philosophy.

Representation

was conceived on the equality-population basis.

Witn the

court's premise, gerr)"I!landering could not exist.

It was

and is a term creating inequality by the very fact that it
admits

to some type of special interest, whether it be

partisan ties, geographic boundaries, or the like.
problem, therefore, is the reconcilability of
concepts.

~nese

The
two

To propose an elaboration of "the standard beyond

mere mathematical equality 11 5 6 is to suggest that the court
nullify its adamant stand on 'one-man, one-vote' and turn
55N.
(Ber~eley:

w.

Folsby, ed., Rea ortionment in tr!e 1970's
University of California Press, 971 , pp. 121-122.

5bibid., p. 122.
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bac% to apportionment standards of pre-Baker times.
The Burger Court in its Mahan vs Prichard decision took a
definite step in this direction.

The case involved

Virginia's House redistricting statute which was challenged
on the basis that there were impermissible population variances in the districts, that the multimember districts
diluted representation, and that the use of the multimember districts constituted. racial gerrymandering. 11 57
The court ignored the racial gerrymandering issue, but by
its punctuated affirmance of "the State's rational objective
of preserving the integrity of political subdivision lines 11 5 8
and by its allowance for greater percentage flexibility
in population variances among districts, it backed away from
Baker vs Carr and Reynolds vs Sims and walked right into
the concept underlying the gerrymander, e.g. the preservation
of district lines because of politics, history, natural
boundaries, or other special features.
Another consequence of the Warren Court's majoritarian
philosophy and reasoning is that Baker vs Carr and more
especially Revnolds vs Sims with its adjoining decision
Lucas vs Forty-Forth General Assembly of Colorado have
reflected a change in the fundamental ideological concept
of the division of power as manifested in the balancing
57Mahan vs Prichard, ill LW u277.
5Sibid.
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version of the separation of powers.

The Federal Constitution

derived its balancing version of the separation of powers
from adopted state constitutions, most particularly that
of Massachusetts which had been chiefly framed by John Adams
in 1 (8 O.
The doctrine of the separation of powers had grown
through several centuries of English and French history
and its adoption in framing governments had been urged
for one or several reasons as noted by W. B. Gwyn in his
monograph The Meaning of the Separation of Powers.

They

were for efficiency in government, for fairness to the
common good in legislating laws, for assurance that administration of the laws was impartially given and that administrators were subject to them also, for allowance that
representatives of the people might be able to

ma~e

executive

officers accountable for abuses of their power, and finally
for the establishment of

'a

balance of governmental powers. 11 59

It was John Adams who laid much of the initial groundwork
for the acceptance in American political circles of the
balancing version of the separation of powers.

He introduced

the threefold concept of governmental branches and their
functions.

The judiciary was his important inclusion.

In his writings of 1776, Adams was solicitious about the
weakness of the judiciary.

59w.

It was his belief and

~ear

that

B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers
(New Orleans: Tulane University 1965), p. 127-128 •

.

.-~·

40
the judiciary would not survive a struggle between the
executive and a

de~ocratic

unicameral legislature; a legis-

lature of such composition "would undermine the courts. 116 0
The solution seemed to be

t~e

adoption of:

A mixed constitution with an aristocratic
chamber in the legislature to hold the balance
between the monarchic executive and the democratic legislative ch8J!lber.
Adams thus proposed
two overlapping sets of checks and balances;
the three branches of th~ government and the
monarchic, aristocratic, aud democratic parts
of the legislative branch.bl
John Adams had endeavored to incorporate these ideas into
constitutions of the South, such as Virginia, as well as
many other states.

But Virginia's political leaders and

the leaders of some other states regarded his ideas with
disdain.

They succeeded in drafting constitutions highly

majoritarian in philosophy and content.

This was manifest

in their provisions for popularly elected legislatures.
From Adams' writing and the Massachusetts Constitution,
wherein the Senate and the House were distinguished in
apportioning the former by taxes and the latter by people,
to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a shift in empr.asis
beca~e

apparent.

Adams' basic structural formulation, which

was one of the features giving the Massachusetts Constitution
such great longevity, was to be the cornerstone of American

6ow.

B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers
(New Orleans: Tulane University 1965), p. 117

61 Ibid.
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constitutionalism.

The concern became centered upon

legislative imbalance as a result of inadequate state
constitutional provisions and the rising tide of popular
despotism exemplified by Shay's Rebellion.

Probably the

most vocal and the most acutely aware of their constitution's
defects were Virginians such as Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison.

They and many others had seen with the

passage of time and the rapid occurence of changing events,
the importance of the balancing version of the separation
of powers, the need for its further development, and the
utmost urgency of its acceptance.

Popular despotism was

an ugly reality during the post-revolutionary war and
pre-convention years.

Its threat was vividly portrayed in

Gordon Wood's book, The Creation of the .American Republic.
Through observations of men made during this era, Wood
captured the fears this ominous head created:
"Wherever the real power in a Government lies,"
Madison told Jefferson, "there is the danger
of oppression. In our Governments the real
power lies in the majority of the Community,
and the invasion of private rights is chiefly
apprehended, not from acts of Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but
from acts in which the Government is the mere
instrument of the major number of the
constituents." The people, it seemed, were
as capable of despotism as any prince; public
liberty was no guarantee after all of private
iiberty. At the be~inning of the Revolution,
wrote Madison, Americans obvieusly had not perceived this danger to the private rights of property
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from public liberty. "In all the Governments
which were considered as beacons to republican
patriots and law givers, the rights of persons
were subjected to those of property"; throughout history the poor had always been sacrificed
to the rich. In 1776 Americans had assumed that
their society was unique--so egalitarian that
both rights coincided, so different that "a
provision for the rights of person was supposed
to include of itself those of property." And
Americans naturally inferred, said Madison,
"from the tendency of republican laws"--like
the abolition of primogeniture and entail-11that these different interests would be more
and more identified." But alas! "experience
and investigation° had eventually taught Madison
that America was not different from other
societies, that equality of condition was a
chimera. Only a minority, said Madison, "can
be interested in preserving the rights of
property." Yet what could be done? In 1786
a New Jersey critic of this majoritarian tyranny
had argued that there were occasions when the
legislature must ignore the voice of its
constituents. "A virtuous legislature will not,
cannot listen to any proposition, however popular,
that came within the description of being
UNJUST, impolitic, and unnecessary." 'tr'hen we
are not a republican government," was the
formidable reply, 11 for the evident significance
thereof is that the people (the majority of the
people) bear rule, and it is for them to determine
wether a proposition is UNJUST, IMPOLITIC, and
UNNECESSARY or not. 0 6 2
The remedy for this threat which the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention sought, was solidly rooted in
John Adams' balancing version of the separation of powers.
Although the mode with regard to the legislature differed
from Adams' application of it in the Massachusetts Con::>titution
of 1780 because of the consideration of the union of several
states, nevertheless, the principle remained deep and abiding.
62 Gordon s. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1969), pp. 410-411.
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Nearly two hundred years later, Chief Justice Earl
Warren in Reynolds vs Sims implied modern ac.mowledgment of
the existence of the balancing version of the separation
of powers and its vitality when he attempted to reassure
all that although both houses of the legislature would be
based on population,

t~ere

were possibilities enabling each

body to be differently composed.

However, he did not probe

into its historic purposes, but rather he noted the most
obvious reason for bicameralism as the insurance of
"mature and deliberate consideration of, and to prevent
precipitate action on proposed legislative measures. 116 3
Warren assured that difference in numbers between houses,
difference in district sizes from which each body could be
elected, difference in the length of terms for senators and
representatives, and difference in single and multi-member
districts could be used by the states to achieve the objective
of engendering "differing complexions and collective attitudes
in the two bodies of a state legislature. 1164 During preconstitutional times and thereafter most of these methods
had been used by one state or another in varying forms.

In

spite of this fact, Adar.is chose to build a much firmer foundation by having the legislative branches apportioned differently;
an idea readily adopted by New Hampshire in their 1784
6 3Reynolds vs Sims 84 S.Ct. 1387.
64Ibid •

.

•
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Constitution.

Interestingly enough Warren's decision

in effect declared ~ew HaMpshire's 1784 constitutional
provision for apportionment unconstitutional.

Until

November, 1964, New Hampshire had retained the 1784 apportionment section.

This contrast gives emphasis to the

difference from interpreting and applying the balancing
version of the separation of powers in the 1780's and in
the 1960's.

CHAPTER IV
STANDING
The court, having established its jurisdiction on
this foundation of logic, proceeded to the issue of 'standing'.
This was the determination of whether there was a position
in the Baxer vs Carr case from which legal rights and
duties might be asserted or enforced.

Among the three

arguments it was the shortest and the most unnoticed.

That

it is the least-mentioned issue of the decision would seem
to indicate an oversight as to its significance.

If so,

this is unfair since it contains matters pivotal to the
entire case.

Justice Brennan made a statement for the

majority wherein past judicial action with regard to voting
was summarized.

In it are elements suggestive of the need

for a judicious pause:
A citizen's right to vote free of arbitrary

impairment by state action has been judicially
recognized as a right secured by the Constitution,
when such impairment resulted from dilution by
false tally, cf. United States vs. Classic ••• , or
by a refusal to count votes from arbitrarily
selected precincts, cf. United States vs. Mosley ••• ,
or by a stg~fing of the ballot box, cf. Ex parte
Siebold •••
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Behind his remark lies the asswnption that the 1901 Tennessee
statute, in which the Jeneral Assembly passed the
tionment Act abandoning separate

en~~eration

Appor-

required by

an 1870 statute "in favor of reliance upon the Federal
Census, 1166 fell within the same juristical rule or
standard as United States vs Classic, United States vs
Mosley, and Ex parte Siebold.

To facilitate an understanding af

the validity of this assumption, it is necessary to examine
the facts of these cases pertinent to Baker and to review
the history and circumstances fran which these cases evolved.
Among the Radical Reconstruction measures of 1870 and
1871 were the Enforcement Act of 1870 and its supplementary
amendment, the Enforcement Act of February, 1871.

The

provisions of these acts had their genesis in the extension
of Negro suffrage and the subsequent exploits of the Ku

Klux

Klan and other similar organizations to whose activities
much of the South had become an arena.

The principle target

of the organizations' activities were Negroes, toward them
the South's fears of political and racial supremacy were
directed.

Intimidation ranged from burning crops and hoMes

to physical mutilation and murder.

So rampant were these

atrocities, that growing public demand forced Congress and
the President to act.

This humanitarian concern coupled

with political motives prompted Congress to adopt the
Enforcement Act of 1870, or as Alan Trelease noted:
66 Baker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 705.
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When Congress was finally moved to action in
1870, it was thinking of the coming fall elections
as much as tLe personal plight of Southern
Republicans. The Fifteenth .Amendment had just
confirmed and extended Negro suffrage and empowered
Congress to enforce it by appropriate legislation. The Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870,
was concerned primarily wit~ the bribery or
intimidation of voters, which it made a federal
offense, punishable in federal courts. But
section 6 made it a felony for two or more
persons to deprive someone of any right or
privilege of citizenship, or to punish him afterward
for having exercised it •. And if anyone, in
violating these provisions, committed any other
crime he was subject to the same penalties
provided for that offense by the state in which
it was committed. The President, finally, was
empowered to use the armed forg7s of the United
States to apprehend violators.
Sadly enough, the victims of these atrocities rarely received
redress, and the Supreme Court in 1876 virtually "emasculated
the Enforcement Acts by ruling" 68 in United States vs Reese
and United States vs Cruikshank

'~hat

the federal government

could protect civil rights only against their abridgment
by states, not individuals." 6 9
Yet the Supreme Court upheld fraudulent state interference in elections as a penal offense punishable under
federal law.

Ex parte Siebold in 1879 was a strong affirma-

tion by the court en this point.

The defendant, Judge

Siebold of Maryland, had engaged in ''stuffing the ballot box"70
6 7Alan Trelease, White Terror (New York:
Row, 1971), p. 385.
68

~., p. 418.

6 9Ibid.
70Ex parte Siebold 100 U.S. 379.
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to distort election results.

Justice Joseph Bradley delivered

the majority opinion asserting that Judge Siebold was a
state officer and that fraudulent actions such as "stuffing
the ballot box 1171 were explicit criminal offenses by state
officials for which relief could be sought.
federal jurisdiction.

It was under

United States vs Mosley in 1914 involved

a litigation against two state election officers of
The main charge was conspiracy "to injure and
oppress certain qualified electors 1172 from exercising
Oklahoma.

their right to vote.

The end result of their actions was the

omission of certain individuals' ballots from the count.
From this conspiracy other charges arose, but it was in reference
to the act of omission that Justice Oliver Holmes applied
the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 and declared such an
act a criminal offense.

Likewise, it was within this

context that the often-quoted sentence came into being:
"We regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to
have one's vote counted is as open to protection by Congress
as the right to put a ballot in a box. 117 3

In United States

vs Mosley the principles set down in Ex parte Siebold were
reaffirmed.

The remaining case cited by Justice Brennan in

Baker was the United States vs Classic decision of 1940.
7 1 Ex parte Siebold 100 U. S. 379.
72 united States vs Mosley, 238 u. S.
73Ibid. p. 386.

3e5.
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The election laws were extended to include primary elections.
As a consequence the conspiracy and actual "alteration of
the

ballots~ 7 h

cast and the "false certification of the

number of votes cast for the respective candidates"75
by the Commissioners of Elections in Louisiana was criminal
under federal statute and therefore within federal
jurisdiction.
All three of these cases demonstrate a relatively narrow interpretation of the Revised Statutes relating to those
sections drawn from the EnforceMent Acts of May, 1870 and
February, 1871, and voting rights to be protected.
contains specific criminal offenses.

Each one

But in the assertion

of such jurisdiction, particularly the post-Reconstruction
decision Ex parte Siebold, federal over state authority is
of prime importance.

It was on this foundation that Justice

Brennan based his assumption that these cases were within
the same juristical rule or standard as

Ba~er

vs Carr.

However, he failed to distinguish the judicial questions in
Baker from those he cited.

The failure is judicially repre-

hensible, for the meaning of these decisions and phrases
concerning criminal election offenses has been placed in a
purely political context.

When a juristical standard has been

broadened to such a degree, is there not a need for clarification and more careI'ul consideration and attention?

7hunited States vs Classic, 313 U.
?5Ibid.

s.

309.

CHAPTER V
JUSTICIABILITY
Probably the most controversial section of Baker vs
Carr was the one devoted to the justiciability argument.
It contained many references to the judicial doctrine of
'political questions' that Chief Justice John Marshall
introduced into U.S. Constitutional law and that was further
expanded and elaborated upon by later justices.

Invoking

this doctrine enabled the court to avoid a confrontation
it felt obliged to avoid because of the nature of the issue
or the circumstances from which it arose.

The volatileness

of the legal problem might stem from various sources.

Two

of the most obvious would be if it was a national issue of
extreme emotional import to which the court might go counter,
or more likely it might be an infringement upon the powers
exercised by the executive or legislative branches of the
government.

One of the court's milestones in the development

of the 'political questions' doctrine was the 1849 Supreme
Court case Luther vs Borden with the majority opinion written
-by Chief Justice Roger Brook Taney.

So frequently does

Justice Brennan mention and allude to it, that to appropriately
examine the justiciability argument of Baker would be accomplished best by first delving into Luther vs Borden.
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It was from the Rhode Island setting of the Dorr
War in the early 1840's that the court's final pronouncement
of Luther vs Borden, February, 1849 came.

Before going

into specific argW'lents and opinions, a recapitulation of
events leading to the Dorr War is essential.
Due to substantial industrial expansion during the 1830 1 s,
Rhode Island experienced a transformation in its economic,
social, and political structure.

The development of steam

power, the creation of new industries, and the renovation
of older industries through newly-applied technical inventions
were arnong the immediate causes giving impetus to Rhode
Island's shift from a primarily maritime economy to an industrial one.

Inherent to this change was the relocation of

people, capital, and to a certain extent, industry itself.
New centers of growth spotted the rivers and coastal region
where steam power was accessible.

Urban areas, particularly

Providence, eagerly sought to take advantage of the conditions
and becarne the hub of commercial endeavor; whereas, other areas,
such as Newport, lagged behind and even diminished in size,
either because they lacked

t~e

aggressive initiative of

their more northern competitor or because the geography of
the region was ill-suited to industrial development.
In addition to the harnessing of steam power and tne everpresent concern of Rhode Island entrepreneurs to seek economic

diversification, the beginning waves of French Canadian and
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Irish Catholic immigrants were

~aking

ticularly in industrial centers.

themselves felt, par-

The combination of

industrial expansion and an immigrant labor force created a
sharp delineation in the character of the urban-rural communities.

The urban community reflected an increasingly large

number of landless Catholic workers contrasted with the
predominately land-owning Protestant rural community whose
numbers were comparatively few and in many instances decreasing.
These economic and social changes brought with them a
pressing need for political reform both within the context
of extended suffrage and the equalization of representation.
The former was obviously evident, since Rhode Island still
retained its suffrage provision that a man must have $134
worth of real property to be eligible to vote.

This qualifi-

cation coupled with the circumstances, previously mentioned,
of the swelling numbers of landless people in the cities made
such a provision an anachronism.

The latter need for political

reform was equally, if not more, apparent.7 6
Further compounding the complexity of the political
situation in Rhode Island was the desire of many electors to
have a bill of rights.

Rhode Island was unique among the

colonies in that it continued under the Charter granted to it
by Charles II.

After the Revolutionary War, most of the

7 6 Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from Property
to Democrac~ 1760-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1960 , p. 246.
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colonies adopted their own constitutions and bill of rights
from which much of the Federal Constitution was patterned.
Several times during Rhode Island's history, the General
Assembly attempted to do

li~ewise,

but the British Occupation

of 1777 thwarted one attempt and a later effort in the 1820 1 s
was shelved by the Assembly and eventually defeated.
(This last effort began as an exercise in political pacification rather than a sincere gesture to change the existing
government.)
Although Rhode Island continued under a charter government, the colony, later the state, actively participated both
in the writing and signing of the Declaration of Independence
and in the discussions and decisions of the Constitutional
Convention.

As a state, the charter government sent senators·

and representatives to Congress, but this was dimmed in the

1830 1 s by gross inadequacies found in limited suffrage,
malapportionment, and the absence of a bill of rights.

It

was within this political climate that Thomas Dorr and his
followers gained prominence.
Thomas Dorr was the son of a Rhode Island merchant, who
had extensive experience in trading with China.

Being from

the merchant class meant being among the socially elite
distinction by early nineteenth century standards in Rhode
Island.

His education rerlected this, ror among the schools

he attended were Exeter and Harvard.

From European travel
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and study, Dorr became ardently imbued with Jeffersonian
ideals, and upon his return to the United States, he applied
himself to the study of law.

Several years were spent in the

practice of law until Thomas Dorr became a politician and
was elected a legislator to the General Assembly.

Hereupon,

Dorr involved himself in efforts to secure suffrage,
representation, and judicial reform.

At the outset his

provisions for reform were moderate, for he only wished
to extend suffrage "to middle-class taxpayers and, perhaps,
militiamen."77

But these proposals were turned down by the

legislature, and the nucleus of Dorr supporters fell into
oblivion only to be followed by a more radical group.

It

was this group that took affirmative action to correct
political abuses by calling a constitutional convention and
adopting and ratifying a constitution, which had among some
of its provisions the extension of suffrage to all white,
twenty-one year old males.

The People's Constitution won a

majority of votes from the Rhode Island electorate which
:lncluded the Constitution's newly-enfranchised voters.

After

its acceptance the Dorrites submitted their constitution to
the Governor and the General Assembly of the Charter Go\'ernment,
whereupon it was soundly rejected and in its place, the
Algerine Law was passed prohibiting anyone from taking part
77Peter J. Coleman, The Transformation of Rhode Island
(Providence: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 259.

55
in the Dorrite

move~ent

under the threat of punishment

for misdemeanor, high crime, or treason.

Defying the

Charter Governrnent's action, the Dorrites held elections
for the selection of officers and chose Thomas Dorr as
governor.

They declared this to be the legitimate govern-

ment and Dorr sent himself on an unsuccessful mission to
obtain President Tyler's support and approval.

Returning

to Rhode Island, Dorr and his followers attempted to seize
a small arsenal at Providence, but their efforts were thwarted
by a forewarning given to the tiny garrison and by the damp
atmosphere which prevented the Dorrite cannon from firing.
As Peter Coleman recalled in his book The Transformation of
Rhode Island, dense fog also covered the area and as it lifted,
Dorr found he had been virtually abandoned by his followers
who had crept away unseen.

With the choice of arrest or

flight, he fled Rhode Island leaving it within the Charter
Government's temporary pale of martial law.

This abortive

attempt and the events associated with it are commonly
referred to as the Dorr War.

After the incident of the

Providence arsenal and an earlier June seizure effort at
Chetapatchet, the Charter Go·iernment in May, 1843 adopted
and ratified a new constitution based largely upon the
originally moderate Dorr

proposals.

With its acceptance

by the majority oI' Rhode Island voters, the old Charter

Government relinquished its powers to the new.
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From this Rhode Island controversy and insurrection,
the Luther vs Borden case arose.

Martin Luther, the plain-

tiff, was known to have been an active Dorrite.

Luther

Borden, the defendant, was a Charter Government militia man
who had bro:{en into Luther's house attempting to secure
Martin Luther's person for arrest under the existing law which
prohibited involvment in the Dorr movement.

Martin Luther's

contention was that Borden had unlawfully entered his house,
since the Dorr Government was the legitimate government
at the time and thus the law under which Borden acted was
null and void.
Delivering the majority opinion Chief Justice Taney
addressed himself to the practicalities of the court's
establishing the Dorr Government's legitimacy.

The initial

question necessarily involved the actual existence of such a
government, or as Taney stated:
We do not understand from the argumEl'lt that the
constitution under which the plaintiff acted is
supposed to have been in force after the constitution of May, 1843, went into operation. The
contest is confined to the year preceding. The
plaintiff contends that the charter government
was displaced, and ceased to have any lawful
power, after the organization, in May, 1842
of the Government which he supported, and
although that government never was able to
exercise any authority in the State, nor to
command obedience to its laws or to its
officers, yet he insists that it was the lawful and established government, upon the ground
that it was ratified-by a large majority of the
male people of the State of the age of twenty-one
and upwards, and also by a majority of t~ose who
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were entitled to vote for general officers
under the then existing laws of the State. 78
A few paragraphs later he noted the immediate problems
underlying a court decision recognizing the Dorr Government
as the truly existing government during this time and agreeing that the charter government had been annulled by such
action:
••• then the laws passed by the Legislature
during that time were nullities; its taxes
wrongfully collected; its salaries and
compensations to its officers illegally paid;
its public accounts improperly settled; and
the judgments and sentences of its courts in
civil and criminal cases null and void, and
the officers who carried their decisions into
operation answerable as trespassers, if not
in some cases criminals.79
But aside from these noticeable effects, Taney recognized
far more serious implications arising from the arguments
presented by the attorneys for the plaintiff.

It was this

nucleus around which several interpretations of the
Guarantee Clause of the U.

s.

Constitution revolved.

The

potential impact of these interpretations should begin with
a restatement of the Clause:
The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a republican form of
government, and shall protect each of them
against invasion; and an application of the
legislature, or the executive (when the legislature cag8ot be convened) against domestic
violence.J

7e
' Luther

vs Borden, 7 Howard 597.

79 roid.

80 u.

s.,

Constitution, art. IV, sec.

4.
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The thesis underlying

t~e

pro-Dorr appeal given by

Mr. Benjamin Hallett was:
••• that government is instituted by the people,
and for the benefit, protection, and security of
the people, nation, or community. And that
when any government shall be found inadequate
or contrary to these purposes, a majority of
the cormnunity hath an indubitable, inalienable,
and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or
abolish the same, in such manner as shall, be
judged most conducive to the public wea1.51
The Hallett argument was profuse with statements reflecting
these principles in one way or another.
was given the Guarantee Clause.

Little mention

Only in an advancement

of a "proposition as to the theory of American government, 1182
which was a reiteration primarily of the peoples• sovereignty
and their right to adopt a form of government, was the
phrase tac,:ed on "subject only to a limitation provided
by the United States Constitution, that the State governments
shall be republican. 118 3 It was towards the end of the
concluding argument that any substantial discussion of the
Clause was made, and this fell within the confines of
just interpreting the portion relating to "domestic violence. 1184
Concentration on these principles to the near exclusion
of the Guarantee Clause more than likely benefitted the purposes
of legal disputation.

But the polemical forces of debate by

81 Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 589.

82.1l2.i£., P. 5go.
83 Ibid.
84u.

s.

Constitution, art. IV, sec.

4.
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omission, placement, and accentuation yield a subtle, yet
new, connotation to the Guarantee Clause best described
as libertarian.

The people's sovereignty ana their right

to form a government are elevated above the plane of the
Guarantee Clause, since it is "subject only"B5 to the
Clause's provisions.

The result of these subtle intricacies

is the creation of a concept of the
activist in meaning.

Claus~

positive and

Limitation with its negative con-

notation of restriction upon the principles of sovereignty and
choice changes to a more positive one of qualification, the
minimum qualification of certification requirement being
republican in form.
Responding to these pleadings were John Whipple and
Daniel Webster, attorneys for the defendant or, more
specifically, the Charter Government. Among the many rebuttals,
Webster's description of the Guarantee Clause and its
purpose is notable:
There must be an authentic mode of ascertaining
the public will somehow and somewhere. If not, it
is a government of the strongest and most numerous •••
What do the Constitution and Laws of the United
States say upon this point? The Constitution recognizes the existence of States, and guarantees to
each a republican form of government, and to protect
them against domestic violence. The thing w~ich is
to be protected is the existing State government.
This is clear by referring to the Act of Congress
of 1795. In case of insurrection against a State,
or the government thereof, the Pre3ident is to
interrere.
The Constitution proceeds upon the
idea that each State will ta~e care to establish
its government upon proper principles, and does

8 51uther vs Borden, 7 ~oNard 590.
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not contenplate these extraneous and_irregular
alterations of existing governr.:ents.d6
Furthermore, the right to peaceable revolution was repudiated.
The basic

pre~ise

Webster defined was that the Guarantee

Clause was designed to protect governments in existence.
To buttress his argument Webster referred to Congress'
Enforcement Act of 1795.

The Militia Act of 1792 had expired

and as William Wiecek points out:
Congress, unwilling to dispense with such a useful
statute, re-enacted its substance with some
important changes as the Enforcement Act of 1795
••• The Enforcement Act of 1795 was supplemented
by an 1807 statute authorizing the President to
use regular army forces as well as the federalized
militia for law enforcement purposes. The acts
of 1795 and 1807 remain in the United States Code
today, virtually unaltered from their original
form, as the basic author~tY for federal control
of state military forces.
These considerations were important for two reasons.

First,

Webster used the Congressional Act as supportive evidence
to advance his main premise that the Guarantee Clause was
insurance to keep existing governments intact or, more precisely,
the Guarantee Clause and the obligation to protect were one.
Status quo best describes an interpretation of this nature.
Second, Chief Justice Taney took what Webster intended as a
supportive feature and provided an entirely different rendering of the Guarantee Clause.
86 Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 590.
8 7william M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U. S.
Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 81.
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Addressing himself to the implications in the pleadings
before him, Chief Justice Taney discussed the court's
inability, as a judicial body, to determine the qualifications of voters:
It is the province of a court to expound the
law not make it. And certainly it is no
part of the judicial functions of any court
of the United States to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, giving the right to
those to whom it is denied by the written and
established constitution and laws of the state,
or taking it away from those to whom it is given;
nor has it the right to determine what political
privileges the citizens of a State are entitled
to, unless there is an establi~bed constitution
or law to govern its decision.be
He recognized the difficulties involved if the court were
to take upon itself the task of determining whether a majority
of the voters had or had not approved such a constitution.
It would have required the testimony of witnesses, verification 01· all voters' qualifications, and lastly a question
of how long the people of Rhode Island would have to wait to
find out what government they were living under.
Paramount to these very real problems were several
serious questions.

The first one Chief Justice Taney gave

cognizance to when he noted that this decision would have to
be made by a jury, since the case was a question of fact.
It would then depend upon the jury's judgment to ascertain
the people of Rhode Island's form of government.

88 Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 598.

T.~e

dangers
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arising from this aspect of the case were quic~ly perceived
by Taney who stated:
And as a verdict is not evidence in suit between
different parties, if the courts of the United
States have the jurisdiction contended for by the
plaintiff, the question whether acts done under
the charter government during the period of contest are valid or nor Must always remain unsettled
and open to dispute. The authority and security of
the State go~9rnments do not rest upon such unstable
foundations. ·
The second serious question was not directly approached by
the Chief Justice; rather it was implied in his ready affirmation that cases pertaining to the Guarantee Clause:
••• rests with Congress to decide what government
is the establishaione in a ~tate. For as the
United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide
what government is establishaiin the State before
it can determine whether it is republican or
not. And when the senators and representatives of a
a State are appointed, as well as its republican
character, is recognized by the proper
constitutional authority. And its decision is
binding on every other department of the government, and 5ould not be questioned in a judicial
tribunal. 9
Furthermore, Taney used Webster's supportive argument involving
tne 1795 Enforcement Act to substantiate his position of
congressional and executive jurisdiction with respect to the
Guarantee Clause.
provision of

t~e

Proceeding to the domestic violence
Clause and considering the 1795 Enforcement

Act alongside it enabled the Chief Justice to reinforce his
previous argument with finality.

Taney remarked:

89Luther vs Bordon, 7 Howard 599.
9 oibid.
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So, too as relates to the clause in the
above mentioned article of the Constitution
providing for cases of domestic violence. '
It rested wi t"'.1 Congress, too, to de terrnine
upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfill this guarantee. They might, if they
had deemed it most advisable to do so,
have placed it in the power of the court to
decide when a contingency had happened which
required the federal government to interfere.
But Congress thought otherwise, and no
doubt wisely; and by the Act of February 28,
1795, provided, that, "in case of an insurrection in any State against the government
thereof it shall be lawful for the President
of the United States, on application of the
legislature of such state or of the executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened),
to call forth such number of the militia
of any other State or States, as may be applied
for, as he may judge sufficient to supress
such insurrection."
By this act, the power of deciding whether
the exigency had arisen upon which the
government of the United States is bound to
interfere, is given to the President. He is
to act upon the application of the legislature
or of the executive, and consequently he must
determine what body of men constitute the
Legislature, ~£d who is the governor, before
he can act •••
To one constitutional historian, Williarri Wiecek, Chief Justice
Taney's interpretation of the Guarantee Clause added to the
already "repressive reading that Hamilton had given it in the
Federalist. 1192

Hamilton had viewed the Clause as an instru-

mental device for the Union to assert its authority in
"repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten
9lLuther vs Borden, 7 Howard 599.
92 william M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U. s.
Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 110.
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the existence of the State constitutions ••• 11 93

It was a

safeguard for the preservation of order by the Union.
So concerned was Wiecek about this point and the historical
irony to later be witnessed during Reconstruction that he
very casually passed over the heart of Taney's apprehensions.
Taney's construction of the guarantee clause
was absolutistic, and therein lay its great
vice. Hallett's and Webster's arguments left
him no latitude to maneuver. Hallett insisted
that the Court adopt the.theory of republican
government that was then sharply debated in
political forums and that, if adopted, would have
made the Court the arbiter among fundamental
political theories. Webster took advantage of
this tactical indiscretion to urge total judicial
abstention. Neither course was compelling, but
Webster's appeared to be the less of two eYils,
and Taney too~: it, apparently without considering
its implications for the future.94
Judging the Chief Justice's interpretation as

11

absolutistic"

and pronouncing that "therein lay its vice 119 5 is questionable.
Unless the grounds for Taney's fears are more fully recognized, neithr his position nor its future importance can be
appreciated.
If the court had permitted itself jurisdiction over a
decision of the State or Congress and the Executive relating
to the legitimacy of a form of government, Taney knew it woulo
93Hamilton, Madison, Jay,
Hamilton (New York and Toronto:
p. 139.

The Federalist Paoers No. 21:
The New American Library, 1961)
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not simply be a question of arbitrating "among fundamental
political theories, 1196 but rather it would be a question
of opening the door for the court to supplant those
principles Hallett argued so eloquently for--the sovereignty
of the people and the right to adopt a form of government.
The fundamental implication was explicitly described by
Taney's dissenting colleague, Justice Woodbury:
And if the people, in the distribution of powers
under the Constitution, should ever think of
making supreme arbiters in political controversies, when not selected by nor, frequently amenable
to them, nor at liberty to follow such various
considerations in their judgments as belong to
mere political questions, they will dethrone
themselves and lose one of their own invaluable
birthrights; building up in this way--slowly,
but surely--a new sovereign power in the
republic, in most respects irresponsible and
unchangeable for life, and one more dangerous,
in theory at least, than the 1orst elective
oligarcy in the worst times. 9
It is true Chief Justice Taney was not aware of the implications this case would have upon the future of the South.
Yet with his adherence to federalism, Taney's interpretation
of the Guarantee Clause, unlike Webster's status quo construction preserved not just existing government but the
sovereignty of the people and the other rights Hallett
so convincingly asserted.
Likewise if Luther vs Borden or sections of it are to
be viewed as Taney nationalism, it must be done with utmost
9 6 '...Jilliam M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U. S.
Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 12u.
97Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 603.
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caution.

Tne legislature could be viewed as a political

arena witn its checks and balances, theoretically, more
difficult to control by one faction or another because of
its representative and elective nature.

With the limited

alternatives available, Taney might have considered it much
safer to turn to these two national branches of government,
the legislature and the executive, giving heavy emphasis to
the former than accept a branch, the judicial, which might
prove more susceptible to one dominant control within the
body.

The potential threat of one national branch of the

government was to be balanced by the two other national
branches.

Among this balance states' rights could best be

protected.

If this was one of Taney's underlying motives

in his decision, thmLuther vs Borden under the aegis of
Reconstruction dealt an even more poignantly ironic blow to
his fears than has been previously recognized.

It was the

legislature that brought Luther out of safekeeping and used
it and the Guarantee Clause as a base for extending a great
portion of its authority in reconstructing and readmitting
the South's rebel states.
But irrespective of this, Taney's main concern was the
preservation of the sovereignty

o~

the people, their right to

adopt a form of governI11ent, and the guarantee of a republican
governnent.
tr~e

By his pronouncement the Chief Justice separated

tt:reads of the web Sallett's libertarian argurlent had

woven and ultimately kept these fundamental doctrines distinct
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and alive.

It was for this purpose that

Ro~er

Brook
'"
Taney adopted a steadfast position on the political
question doctrine.
The relationship of Luther vs Borden to Baker vs
Carr is best expressed in Justice Felix Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Baker where he liberally rebuked the
Majority saying:
To find such a political conception legally
enforceable in the broad and unspecific guarantee
of equal protection is to rewrite the Constitution.
See Luther v. Borden, supra. Certainly, "equal
protection" is no more a secure foundation
for judicial judgment of the permissibility of
varying forms of representative government tha~
is "Republican Form." Indeed since "equal
protection of the laws" can only mean an equality
of persons standing in the same relation to whatever governmental action is challenged, the
determination whether treatment is equal presupposes a determination concerning the nature
of the relationship. This with respect to apportionment~ means an inquiry into the theoretic
base of representation in an accountably republican state. For a court could not determine
the equal-protection issue without first determining the Republican-Form issue, simply because
what is reasonable for equal-protection purposes
will depend upon what form of government,
basically, is allowed. To divorce "equal protection" from "Republican Form" is to talk about
half a question.90
So incisive was his perception of the court's position that
it haunted the justiciability argument with special fervor.
Justice Brennan answered in lively judicial debate:
Rather it is argued that apportionment cases,
whatever the actual wording

or

the complaint,

can involve no federal constitutional right
98 Baker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 755-756.
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except one resting on the guaranty of a republican form of government, and that complaints
based on that clause have been held to present
political questions which are nonjusticiable.
We hold that the claim pleaded here neither
rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause
and that its justiciability is therefore not
foreclosed by our decisions of cases involving
that clause: •• Appellants' claim that they are
being denied equal protection is justiciable,
and if "discrimination is sufficiently s~:own,
the right to relief under the equal protection
clause is not diminished by the fact that
discrimination relates to political ~~ghts."
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 u:s. 1, 11 •••
Soon after this response Justice Brennan proceeded
to give an elaborate discussion of the 'political
questions doctrine.'

He attempted to define the doc-

trine as well as demonstrate its applicability in the
various important decisions containing it.

Highlighting

Brennan's reassessment of the doctrine was Luther vs Borden.
Heavily emphasizing Chief Justice Taney's crescendo of sup-

porting arguments and the final declaration, Justice
Brennan omitted the context of Taney's apprehensions which
were the heart behind his reasoning and which were steeped
with the 'political question doctrine' so quic%ly crystallized
by Justice Woodbury.

This omission resulted in the

Majority's failure to give a true rendering of the political
question doctrine' and the Guarantee Clause in the most
crucial and relevant of the cases discussed.
What Justice Brennan did was establish a political
right and divorce it
9

fro~

any consideration of government.

9Ba~er vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 755-756.
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By implication the ~:ajoritJ accepted its parallel

application of the equal protection clause in
Board of Education and 3aker vs Carr.

Bro~n

vs the

The result of this

reasoning was the development of a new majoritarianism
whereby representation was conceived on the equalitypopulation basis.

With Brennan's foundation of logic,

gerrymandering could not exist.

Its consideration would

only mean inequality, because it is a term which admits
to some type of special interest.

Also, acceptance of

Baker vs Carr anj Reynolds vs Sims was an implied acknowledgement of the modern interpretation of the balancing
version of the separation of powers.
It is something of a paradox that a Chief Justice who
handed down Luther vs Borden, a decision extremely instrumental in preserving the constitutional characteristics
of our Union, and Dred Scott vs

Sanford, a gross perpet-

uation of civil injustice and a decision contributing to
the outbreak of the Civil War, should find his historical
opposite nearly a century later in Chief Justice Earl
Warren who presided over Brown vs the Board of Education,
one of many decisions his court rendered alleviating
serious civil injustices, and Baker vs Carr, an attempt
to solve the

~alapportionment

problem of the states by

injecting into constitutional law a new

philosop~y

of
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majcritarianism.

The latter was based upon questionable

judicial logic and accompanied by a modern statement
of a fundamental ideological principle of

&~erican

con-

s ti tu tionalism, the balancing version of the separation
of powers.

Perhaps it is here that Justice

objection should be posed.
the "political thicket"?

Fran~furter's

Should the court have entered
The answer may be found in the

effect the judicial reasoning of Baker vs Carr has had
upon constitutional law and political thought and it may
be found in the Oregon experience, wherein a state could
and did resolve this controversial problem before
Supreme Court action was taken.

u. s.
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